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Zusammenfassung
Schon zu Beginn der Okkupation Dänemarks durch die Deutschen entwarf
das Reichsministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (REM) einen Plan
zur Organisierung der Landwirtschaft in Dänemark, dessen erklärtes Ziel
die Maximierung der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion und der Lieferung von
Lebensmitteln nach Deutschland war. Grundlage der deutschen
Wirtschaftspolitik war die freiwillige Mitarbeit der dänischen Institutionen,
der Bauern und deren Organisationen. Die Politik versuchte, diese zu
fördern und zu erhalten. Zum Vorteil beider Parteien errichteten der
deutsche Staatssekretär Backe und der Oberhändler Dr. Walter ein sehr
effektives System, in dem die Bauern und die dänische Gesellschaft im
allgemeinen aus ihrem eigenen Interesse heraus die Produktion und die
Exporte nach Deutschland erhöhten.
Mogens R. Nissen has graduated in history and political science from
the University of Copenhagen. Recently, he has handed in his
PhD.-dissertation concerning Danish agriculture during the German
occupation 1940–1945 at the University of Southern Denmark. He is an
associate lecturer at the University of Copenhagen and working on a
report for the Danish Research Agency (Statens Humanistiske
Forskningsråd).
Introduction
The Danish food production was of significant importance to the German
occupying power during World War II. It ensured a substantial contribution
of food to the German population and the German armed forces.
Nevertheless, there are no indications that the Danish food production
played any role for the decision to occupy Denmark on the 9th of April
1940.1 This has led to the conclusion that the leading German authorities
knew little about Danish economy and production before the occupation.2
One aim of this article is to show that the leading civil German authorities
had an extensive knowledge on Danish economy and production already
before the occupation. There was no German master plan,3 but the
Staatssekretär in Reichsministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft
(REM), Herbert Backe, the German top negotiator Dr. Alex Walter and their
subordinate Dr. Franz Ebner at the German Embassy in Copenhagen knew
well how to maximize Danish food production under the given
circumstances.4 This led to an arrangement in which the Danish food
production and food consumption were managed mainly by differentiated
prices on agricultural products and and less by strict control over the
farmers and the consumers. By letting the fixed prices on milk and butter
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to stimulate the farmers to maintain milk production and cut down the
production of eggs, beef and pork. This policy already started before the
occupation of Denmark when Dr. Walter in the beginning of April 1939
accepted a price increase on Danish butter exported to Germany.
It is fair to describe the situation of the Danish economy in general and
Danish agriculture in particular as problematic when Denmark was
occupied. Denmark’s economy was very dependent on foreign trade with
Great Britain as the most important market for Danish goods, while
Germany was the second most important export market.5 Some 75 percent
of all Danish exports were agricultural products and 97 percent of the bacon
and 75 percent of the butter exports were sold at the British market in 1938
and 1939.6 At the same time, almost all the feed and most fertilizers were
imported from overseas destinations, which were controlled by the British
navy. This meant that when Denmark was occupied it had to stop all
exports to Great Britain and send all goods to Germany or German
controlled areas instead. At the same time it was impossible to import feed
and phosphorus fertilizers, because the German occupying power did not
supply Denmark with these goods, so the farmers had to cut down the
herds of animals and reduce the production of animal products.
The time between the outbreak of the war and the German occupation was
difficult for the Danish farmers. Even though the Danish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs succeeded in making an arrangement, the so-called Maltese-Trade-
Agreement that allowed Denmark to maintain normal trade with both
belligerent sides of the war, the exports of agricultural products suffered.7
The British government introduced war-economy from the beginning of
September 1939 with price controls, rations on food and devaluation of the
currency, which meant a drop in both export quantities and export prices.
Thus, after six months with hard negotiations between Danish and British
authorities an agreement for the total Danish exports in 1940 was reached
in March 1940. According to this agreement export quantities of butter and
bacon would fall some 40 percent compared to 1939.8 At the same time, in
February and March 1940, the German negotiators indicated willingness to
pay higher prices for Danish agricultural products if Denmark could provide
higher export quantities9 but because of the Danish neutrality it was
impossible to transfer export quantities from the British to the German
market.
In that perspective one can argue that the German occupation was
convenient for the Danish farmers. Suddenly it was possible to sell all
goods at higher prices. The negotiators from the agricultural organizations
tried to increase prices on food to the maximum during the first years of the
German occupation, because they felt entitled to gain as much as possible
to rectify the imbalance. To ensure maximum production the German
negotiators had a similar interest in managing the agricultural production by
differentiated prices on food at a much higher level than before the
occupation.
Presentation of the negotiating positions
The head figure on the German side in negotiations with Danish authorities
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Dr. Alex Walter. When Denmark was occupied he had been the chairman of
the German Government Committee since 1936. Danish negotiators in the
Danish Government Committee and in the so-called Export Committees
knew him very well. On the Danish side senior officials from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, with undersecretary Matthias Wassard as chairman, were
negotiating in the Government Committee, which had to make agreements
on the extent of the trade with Germany, before and during the German
occupation. Dr. Walter’s primarily job was to negotiate imports from
Denmark while the deputy chairman in the German Government
Committee, Waldemar Ludwig from the Reichswirtschaftsministerium, was
dealing with exports to Denmark.10
In the 1930s and during the occupation the Government Committee mainly
discussed Danish export quantities and prices at a superior level.11 Detailed
agreements were concluded between the different Reichsstellen and the
Danish Export Committees. Especially the price negotiations were held
between these committees in the time period between September 1939 and
June 1941. The Danish Export Committees not only had a monopoly on
exporting agricultural products but also the exclusive rights to negotiate
price agreements with the Reichsstelle.12 The Reichsstellen concerning
agricultural products was subordinated the REM13 and the negotiators
always had to report back to Dr. Walter since he and his superiors made all
major decisions.14
The situation was completely different concerning the Danish Export
Committees. Officially, they were subordinated the Danish ministry of
agriculture,15 but in reality they were managed and controlled by the
agricultural organizations placed under the Agricultural Council of Denmark
(Landbrugsraadet). Thereby, Danish farmers had the exclusive rights to
negotiate prices on agricultural goods exported to Germany in the first year
of the German occupation.16 No need to say it had a significant impact on
the development of food prices in the time period between April 1940 and
June 1941. The German negotiators wanted to promote specific types of
productions, primarily of milk and butter, by letting prices increase heavily.
The Danish farmers had a similar interest in getting higher prices to
increase their income.17
On the 14th of June 1940 Dr. Ebner sent a telegram to the Auswärtiges Amt
notifying that secretary general in the Agricultural Council, Arne Høgsbro
Holm, wanted to get in contact with Dr. Walter to negotiate prices on
agricultural products. Dr. Ebner explained that Høgsbro Holm had little
confidence in the negotiators Wassard and Jacobsen in the Danish
Government Committee, and wanted a direct contact to Dr. Walter without
interference from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Dr. Ebner recommended
that Dr. Walter contacted Høgsbro Holm via the Ministry of Agriculture, as
Høgsbro Holm was member of all Export Committees. On the 24th of June
1940 Dr. Walter answered Dr. Ebner that he agreed that prices on food had
to increase considerably and that he was aware of the different views of the
Danish Government Committee and the Export Committees. He finished his
letter by stating that future price negotiations were to be held between the
Reichsstelle and the Export Committees.18 So a direct contact was











Presentation of the negotiatin
German price policy at the beg




NORDEUROPAforum | Artikel | Mogens R. Nissen
The Danish government more or less supported increased prices on
agricultural products, mostly because it was concerned that the low prices
in April 1940 would result in a strong fall in production and lead to a
shortage of food supplies. At a meeting on the 6th of March 1941 the
Minister of Agriculture, Kr. Bording from the Social Democratic Party,
explained to the presidency of the Agricultural Council that initially the
government wanted higher prices on food to secure maximal agricultural
production, but now had to stop further price advances.19 Another reason is
that the important agrarian party in the coalition government, Venstre, which
had close connections to the Agricultural Council, was fighting against
attempts at taking away the exclusive rights from the Export Committees.
The increased food prices had a strong impact on the distribution of wealth,
especially in the first two years of the occupation period. This historical
dogma, which Hans Kirchhoff has described as a class struggle between
farmers and workers, shall not be dealt with here.20 It is, however, important
to keep in mind that increasing food prices meant worsening conditions for
other classes of society than farmers when the rise in wages was less.
German price policy at the beginning of the
occupation period
Already before the occupation of Denmark Dr. Walter indicated that he
thought prices on Danish agricultural products were to low and that he
feared a drop in production. This could cause a stop in exports to Germany.
But since Great Britain was the most important market for Danish goods,
the Germans would not pay more than the British and there was nothing he
could do.21 The German negotiators used the same argument several times
the following months.22 At a meeting in Berlin on the 28th of March 1940 the
German negotiators declared that it probably would be possible to pay the
same butter prices as the British, plus a bonus equivalent to the costs of
carriage to England, which were much higher than the costs of carriage to
Germany.23 This was the first time German negotiators expressed
willingness to pay more for Danish goods than the British authorities.
Already on the 3rd of April 1940 the chairman of the Butter-export
Committee reported to the presidency of the Agricultural Council that the
Germans had offered to pay some 18 percent more for Danish butter than
the British offered to pay according to the trade agreement from March
1940, if the better prices were given to dairies exporting to Germany.24
Still there was much uncertainty during the first days after the German
occupation, mainly because Dr. Walter was in Sofia and it was not possible
to get in touch with him until the 15th of April 1940.25 Huge stocks of butter
and bacon targeted for the British marked were warehouse-stored in Danish
harbours and at meetings on the 10th and the 12th of April in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs representatives from the Export Committees were anxious to
find solutions, so the goods could be sold to Germany instead.26 Wassard
was convinced that the Germans were interested both in all future
agricultural products and in buying all food stocks, but the question was
how much they were willing to pay.27 When Dr. Ebner arrived in
Copenhagen on the 12th of April, Danish negotiators he had to face the











Presentation of the negotiatin
German price policy at the beg




NORDEUROPAforum | Artikel | Mogens R. Nissen
Walter notified the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs by phone and by
telegraph that Germany intended to buy all stocks.28 Still there was no
definite indication of the prices the Germans were willing to pay, but it
seems like secretary general Høgsbro Holm had a clear feeling that it was
possible to get higher prices, because on the 12th of April he recommended
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should ensure only the sale of existing
stocks while the Export Committees should still negotiate the prices.
Wassard agreed on this.29 From the 15th to the 21st of April 1940 there were
different meetings between Danish and German negotiators, on which
agreements on sale of the food stocks were confirmed and the prices were
set at the pre-occupational level.30
Already in the first days of the occupation agricultural experts attached to
the Agricultural Council had worked out plans for the future production.
They were based on the fact that it was not possible to import supplies of
feed. The main conclusion was, as it was in a similar plan worked out by the
Danish agricultural attaché A. P. Jacobsen at the Embassy in Berlin, that
the livestock should be kept almost unchanged while the population of pigs
had to be reduced with at least 33 percent.31 Secretary general Høgsbro
Holm informed the presidency of the Agricultural Council on the 17th of April
1940 that the Danish delegation at meetings with German negotiators
had found it expedient to introduce this information to the
German negotiators because it is to be anticipated that the
Germans will be interested in future supplies from Denmark,
and if Denmark does not have a plan for preparations of the
future production, there is a risk that the German negotiators
will try to influence the preparations of the future
production.32
Everything points in the direction that the German agricultural experts
employed by the REM, in the Reichsstelle or in the Reichsnährstand,
already knew the situation of the Danish agriculture well. A central thought
in the Nazi agricultural policy was to create a self-sufficient food production
in the German Großraum33, and several times before the occupation
German negotiators had recommended a change in Danish production, so
the dependence on supplies of feed would be diminished. But the quotation
shows that the Danish negotiators were interested in giving all information
and estimations on future production to the Germans in an attempt at
preventing them from forcing through the preparations.
Danish negotiators succeeded in this and the German occupational power
did not force the proposed production structures through. Instead they used
price mechanisms. The first sign of this was given at a meeting on the 3rd of
May 1940 between Danish agricultural experts, leading members of the
presidency of the Agricultural Council and German experts from the
Reichsnährstand. The German representatives told the Danes that there
was no prospect in getting supplies of feed from Germany or German
controlled areas, so Denmark had to reduce the population of pigs, poultry
and beef cattle. Instead the Germans wanted to maximize the production of
milk-products. One German expert, Dr. Hasselbach, stated: “[…] by the use
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markets.”34
At a meeting on the 23rd of May 1940 secretary general Høgsbro Holm
reported to the members of the Agricultural Council that the representatives
from the Reichsnährstand had declared at meetings in the beginning of May
1940:
Can we help you estimate relative price increases, so the
goods that you – and thereby they mean we – have special
interest in, have a special price increase, and where there
has to be a rapid cut, the price increase will not be strong?
These relative prices, which should help Danish agriculture
though – I will just mention it in the same breath, because it
is something, we will have “the pleasure” of.35
This shows that the Danish negotiators from the Agricultural Council at this
early state of the occupation sensed the overall objectives of the German
price policy. The contents of the policy are confirmed by a summary of a
meeting in the Reichsnährstand on the 15th of May 1940.36 The subject of
the meeting was in short Dänemark, and Ministerialdirektor Herbert Backe
chaired it with Dr. Walter, Dr. Ebner and Dr. Hasselbach as participants
among others. The Germans planned how to change the Danish agricultural
production, in order to so reduce the population of pigs and poultry
dramatically and to keep the livestock almost unchanged during the
summer. But they did not want to force changes through by means of
control and rationings, because they very much doubted that it would cause
the desired results. Only if the Danish population had a direct interest in
rationing it would voluntarily accept it, and only if this was the case, the
German authorities saw rations as a possibility.37 Instead, they carried out a
set of differentiated prices, which made the Danish farmers change the
agricultural production out of economic interest. Prices on poultry had to
increase heavily while prices on eggs needed to fall. Prices on pork were
already high and should remain unchanged while prices on milk-products
had to increase considerably. In this way the German authorities managed
to carry out the desired changes in the Danish agricultural production.38
Looking at this meeting one can conclude several things. Firstly,
Ministerialdirektor Backe and his subordinates had a substantial knowledge
about Danish agriculture from the beginning of the occupation and very
soon a plan for how to carry out the desired changes in production.
Secondly, from the beginning of the occupation period the leading civil
servants in the important REM realized the significance of maintaining the
Produktions- und Lieferfreudigkeit der dänischen Landwirtschaftand they
had a plan to ensure this.
At a meeting in the presidency of the Agricultural Council on the 30th of May
1940 secretary general Høgsbro Holm recommended that the negotiators in
the Export Committees should start to discuss price increases with the
different Reichsstellen to “sense” their views on the subject.39 At the
meeting of the presidency of the Agricultural Council on the 28th of June
1940 the chairmen of the Export Committees reported back from the
negotiations with the different Reichsstellen. The chairman of the Butter-
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possible to get better prices for the products. The chairman of the
Cattle-and beef-export Committee reported that the German negotiators
accepted a small price increase, and that negotiations were kept in a
“businesslike, strictly business approach-manner”40, while the chairman of
the Bacon-export Committee reported that it was impossible to get price
increases on pork. The last one to report was the chairman of the
Egg-export Committee, and he reported from negotiations in Berlin on the
27th of June 1940 that he had been turned down by the Germans when he
had asked for a price increase on eggs.41
This view is confirmed by a summary of a meeting on the 19th of June 1940,
where Dr. Walter and Regierungsrat Meyer-Burckhardt from the REM
instructed the negotiators of the Reichsstellen about their authority in the
coming negotiations with the Export Committees. The instructions, that
followed the above noted line of direction at the meeting in Reichsnährstand
on the 15th of May 1940, were more detailed in regards to prices on
different agricultural products, and made it clear for all that they were
directions worked out by Staatssekretär Backe.42 So it is obvious that
German agricultural authorities and experts firstly expressed their desire for
cooperating with the Danish agricultural organizations in planning the future
production. The pre-worked plan made it easy for the Danish farmers to
cooperate as they shared most of the German interests. Secondly, the
German authorities had no interest in managing production and
consumption by restrictions and control. Instead, they used differentiated
prices in the overall management to maintain and strengthen the
Lieferfreudigkeit of the Danish farmers.
To show that it were not just words it is important to look at the actual
development in food prices during the German occupation. In the following
prices on the three most important agricultural products are listed showing a
similar development as stated by Staatssekretär Backe, Dr. Walter and their
subordinates. Prices on food increased rapidly in the first two years under
German occupation. Especially butter prices increased fast, while it took
more time before prices on pork and beef peaked. From March 1940 to
April 1941 producer prices on butter increased some 81 percent, and
stayed at this level for the remaining years of the German occupation.
Prices on pork increased 39 percent until April 1941 and 60 percent until
May 1943. For the rest of the occupational period prices on pork were
constant. Prices on meat increased 70 percent the first year and 91 percent
until February 1943, whereupon it was constant until the end of the
occupation.43
What determined the producer prices were to a large degree the export
prices. The above mentioned increases in producer prices do not show the
full extend of the German price policy in the first years of the occupation, as
export prices of butter and pork increased much more than producer and
consumer prices. Export prices on butter increased some 100 percent
during the first year under occupation, while Danish consumer prices “only”
increased by some 30 percent.44 From the end of 1940 and during the rest
of the occupational period export prices on butter were some 31 percent
higher than consumer prices, which meant that the Danish government
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butter. This shows that the German occupying power did not wish to
introduce some kind of price rationing in Denmark, and it fits in with several
statements made by Dr. Walter during the occupation. It was important for
the German authorities to ensure that the Danish population had enough
food at prices it could afford as an important method to pursue the main
objective of keeping law and order in Denmark.45 This was the overall
policy during the whole period of occupation, and it is a fact that the
domestic consumption of food in Denmark was fairly constant all these
years, while the exports of food varied in line with the production.46
This does not mean that the German authorities did not want to reduce the
Danish consumption of food. At meetings between the Government
Committees in the beginning of November 1940 the Germans increased the
level of the demands on food supplies for the coming year to such a
standard that the Danish consumption had to be reduced. But they left it to
the Danish authorities to decide how the reduction should be implemented,
as they were convinced that the increased consumer prices on food would
cause a strong reduction in the Danish consumption.47
The development in prices on pork is almost similar to the one on butter, but
it took much longer before price increases were completely carried out.
Export prices on pork increased some 33 percent until November 1941 and
some 59 percent until March 1943, whereupon they were constant during
the rest of the occupation. At the same time Danish consumer prices on
pork increased some 43 percent until November 1941 and 45 percent until
March 1942, whereupon they were constant. After the summer of 1943
export prices were about 25 percent higher than the prices Danish
consumers had to pay.48 They were also higher than producer prices, but it
is difficult to compare, because the above mentioned producer prices do not
show the full extend of the producer prices after October 1942, since Dr.
Walter forced through that the producers should have 0,16 kroner per kg
more, if the deadweight of the pigs were over 80 kg.49 Originally the
Germans wanted a bigger bonus for even heavier pigs, but they agreed on
this model.50 The traditional explanation of the German demand is that
Germans prefer to eat fat schnitzels and not lean chops like the British, but
the explanation is wrong. The German authorities based their demands on
recommendations made by German nutritional experts, who believed that
heavy pigs absorb the feed better than smaller ones and that heavy pigs
could be fed boiled potatoes successfully.51 Preferences of the German
consumers were not involved in the decision.52
It was very important for the Danish government to ensure relatively low
prices on butter, milk and pork for the Danish population so that all groups
of society could afford to buy these products. The bonus given to the
producers, as the producer prices were higher than the consumer prices,
were partly paid by high export prices and partly by subsidies. Again it is
important to note that the German authorities accepted a policy in which
Danish consumers gained from relatively low prices on food compared to
export prices.53
The price development on beef was quite different compared to prices on
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producer prices while consumer prices were restricted, which caused
heavier increases on producer than consumer prices. In the fall of 1940 the
German negotiators wanted to reduce livestock and introduced short
termed advances on export prices, so the prices in September 1940
temporarily increased by ten percent, in October 1940 with an additional
five percent, whereupon the temporary increases were annulled.54 It was
important that the temporary price increases were released to the public, so
the farmers could make the best possible use of it. Though the temporary
price increases became permanent they show again that the German
authorities used prices to manage production and to regulate the dimension
of Danish livestock.
In the fall of 1941 prices on beef increased heavily, primarily caused by
increased export prices, because the German negotiators wanted to reduce
the livestock after a very poor harvest in 1941. Price increases in 1942 were
caused by failing supplies of pork, and especially prices on poor quality beef
increased heavily. This caused the desire of the Danish government to
reduce domestic prices on beef, and from the beginning of 1943 fixed prices
were carried through. This meant that producer and consumer prices from
January 1943 and throughout the rest of the occupation period were at a
constant level 20 percent higher than export prices. The lower export prices
on beef compared to domestic prices caused periodically the
disappearance of beef meant for exports, which several times annoyed the
German negotiators, who, however, still did not establish means to change
the price system. Again it is clear that the Danish consumers had
precedence compared to the exports of food.
German price policy during the second half of the
occupation period
As mentioned in the beginning it was only in the first year of the occupation
period that the Export Committees had exclusive rights to negotiate prices.
After June 1941 the Danish government took away these rights, but they
informed the presidency of the Agricultural Council already in March 1941.
Obviously, the top executives of the Agricultural Council were very
dissatisfied with this decision, as they felt that prices of food were still low.
At meetings in the beginning of March 1941 with the Minister of Agriculture,
Kr. Bording, the presidency argued that prices had to increase more, if the
production should not fall. The basis of this argument was that import prices
had increased more than export prices since the German occupation, so
expenditures were rising more than revenues. Since the presidency
doubted that it would be possible to stop further increases on import prices
and on wages, it wanted to keep the right to negotiate prices on food.55
The minister made it clear that the government had to stop further price
increases on food, as other groups of society suffered from it. Parts of the
presidency of the Agricultural Council, including the president Henrik
Hauch, and the representatives from the organization of smallholders
(Husmandsforeningerne) agreed that the government had to control future
price negotiations, if the Minister of Agriculture was in charge, which the
presidency of the Agricultural Council accepted as the model for the future.
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years had had a very close and confident cooperation with the Social
Democratic minister.56 They also agreed that it would be advantageous for
Denmark and for the farmers, if both import and export prices were kept
constant.57 As mentioned there was little confidence that German export
prices would fall or even be constant in the future, but the members of the
presidency had reason to believe that the Germans would let prices on
Danish exports increase equivalent to the import prices, no matter what the
Danish government did.
During fall and winter of 1940 senior civil servants from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Agriculture, the
Statistical Department and the National Bank discussed the German price
policy in Denmark. There was a general feeling among the civil servants,
especially in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that the Germans wanted to set
prices in Denmark as in Germany, and the object for the civil servants was
to present suggestions that would favour Denmark the most.58 They feared
that the Germans wanted to adjust Danish food prices to the German level,
which would be of benefit to the farmers but also cause inflation and harm
other classes in Denmark. Wassard, chairman of the Danish Government
Committee, therefore asked the agricultural attaché A. P. Jacobsen at the
embassy in Berlin to calculate the price difference between domestic prices
in Germany and Danish export prices on food, including cost of carry. On
the 15th of February 1941 Jacobsen sent the required calculations to
Copenhagen showing that German prices on butter were some 25 percent
higher than the Danish export prices, whereas they were 51 percent higher
on eggs and 29 percent on beef. At the same time export prices on pork
were almost the same as the domestic prices in Germany.59
Apparently Jacobsen made a miscalculation on butter, because on the 10th
of September 1940 he dispatched new calculations to Copenhagen, where
he noted that the difference between export prices and domestic German
prices on butter disappeared in the spring of 1941. He noted also that there
were no differences between prices on pork or eggs, while there was still a
minor difference on beef.60 The fundamental conclusions in Jacobsen’s
calculations from September 1941 are very credible, as he had an
extensive knowledge on trade between Denmark and Germany. He had
been stationed in Berlin since 1921 and had important connections to senior
civil servants in the German ministries, especially in the REM. All together
great importance should be ascribed to his evaluations. Therefore, the
conclusion is the following: From spring 1941 export prices on butter and
pork were at almost the same level as domestic German prices. The price
gap on beef was reduced during the summer of 1941 to less than ten
percent, and apparently it disappeared in the fall of 1941. This is confirmed
by a summary of a meeting in the important German inter-departmental
committee Handelspolitischer Ausschuss on the 7th of April 1941. It was
discussed whether the Danish currency should be revalued compared with
Reichsmark, and Dr. Walter argued against a revaluation fearing a reduction
in the agricultural production. To prevent this the Danish farmers had to be
held indemnified by higher prices on food, and as the export prices already
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So it seems the German authorities implemented a price policy in Denmark
based on the domestic German prices in the first year and a half of the
occupation. Although there are no indications that the objective with the
price policy was to create prices in Denmark at the same level as in
Germany, it turned out to be the result of the policy. In this way Danish
agricultural production was an integrated part of the Nazi-regime’s
agricultural policy, with a general price level being the same as the German
domestic prices. After this time prices on food increased very little, and if
export prices went up, it was either short termed increases to ensure rapid
supplies or to stimulate the production of special goods, for instance the
heavy pigs.
In this article it has not been investigated if prices on goods imported from
Germany were at the same level as domestic German prices, but it is
reasonable to expect that this was the case from the fall of 1942, as import
prices did not increase much after the turn of the year 1941/42.62 This
shows that the German authorities wished to adjust prices in Denmark to
the German level, but they had no interest in causing inflation.63 They
shared the interest of the Danish Government and the Danish trade
organizations, including the Agricultural Council, in fighting inflation.
As mentioned above both export- and import prices were almost constant
the last three years of the occupation. It was not possible for the Export
Committees to enter into agreements with the Germans that would result in
higher prices on food, technically because the Danish government did not
permit it, but in reality because the Germans did not want it. They wanted to
keep prices at the current level, as a mean to pursue their main goal: To
keep law and order in Denmark.
Summary
From the beginning of the German occupation of Denmark the German
Ministry of Nutrition and Agriculture drew up a plan for managing the
agricultural production in Denmark. The objective of the plan was to
maximize the agricultural production and ensure a maximum of food
supplies to Germany. Staatssekretär Backe and chief negotiator Dr. Walter
made the plan, and it was communicated to all German negotiators in
Denmark and to the German Embassy in Copenhagen, so they knew the
German economic policy in Denmark well and were aware of their
authorization in the negotiations with the Danish authorities.
The central element of the plan was to maintain and strengthen the farmers
Produktions- und Lieferfreudigkeit. By the use of differentiated prices on
various agricultural products at a much higher level compared to the
pre-occupational level, the German authorities secured full cooperation of
the Danish farmers and the farmers organizations, which was of significant
importance for the implementation of the plan. The German authorities
behind the plan saw it as the most rational policy in Denmark, and doubted
that restrictions, control and rationings would lead to the desired objectives.
Seen in retrospective one has to agree with them measured by the quantity
of food supplies exported to Germany and by the few resources the











Presentation of the negotiatin
German price policy at the beg




NORDEUROPAforum | Artikel | Mogens R. Nissen
Also the Danish farmers gained from the German policy. It ensured most
farmers a good profit every year during the German occupation, and it
secured that the productive capacity was almost intact when the war was
over. Finally it meant that the production structures in Danish agriculture,
both on the farms and in the processing industry, remained unchanged after
the war compared to structures before the war.
The Danish government had basically the same advantages of the German
policy as the Danish farmers. At the same time the arrangement ensured
the Danish population the highest food consumption per inhabitant in
Europe during the war. At the same time the Danish government succeeded
in keeping the German authorities away from the Danish population and
institutions, and letting the Danish authorities carry out most of the
administration in Denmark. But the policy also had a strong impact on the
distribution of wealth in Denmark. The farmers were benefiting and
especially the unemployed and pensioners lost. Some groups of society in
Denmark had a hard time especially during the first years of the war in
which the cost of food increased heavily and the rate of unemployment was
very high.
The basis of the German economic policy was the voluntary collaboration
by the Danish authorities, the farmers and the farmer’s organizations, and
the focus of the policy was exactly to ensure this. To the advantage of both
Germany and Denmark Staatssekretär Backe and the chief negotiator Dr.
Walter established a very efficient system in which the farmers and the
Danish society in general in their own interests maximized the production
and the exports to Germany.
It is important to note that the German occupying power used the same
economic policy all five years in Denmark. This means that the policy was
the same before and after the Danish government withdrew on the 29th of
August 1943. In the winter of 1944/45 when starvation was epidemic in
Germany, the German authorities did not try to impose harsh rations and
increase food supplies. They still doubted that it would lead to the desired
results.64
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1940–1949. New York 1998, 3 (= Studies in Modern European
History. Vol. 27); Lund, Joachim: Danmark og den europæiske
nyordning. Det nazistiske regime og Danmarks plads i den tyske
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conclusion is (on page 138) that all parties in the parliament supported
the Minister of Agriculture’s bill, which gave “the export committees
monopoly on all exports of agricultural products, where their assignment
hitherto was to control and to regulate.” (“[...] eksportudvalgene fik
monopol på al udførsel af landbrugsprodukter, hvor deres opgave hidtil
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18  Bundesarchiv: BAarch: R901/67771. “Telegramm Nr. 667 vom 11.
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72.
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23 The archives of Landsbrugsraadet: Meddelelse fra Præsidiet til
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Members of the Council).
24 The archives of Landsbrugsraadet: Meddelelse fra Præsidiet til
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Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Agriculture concerning Dr. Walter’s
acceptance of the Danish export-wishes. The German Embassy send a
matter-of-fact telex on the 12th of April 1940 to Berlin explaining that
Wassard had offered 3.800 tons of butter, 187.000 slaughtered pigs and
two millions eggs. Confer Bundesarchiv: BAarch: R901/67741. Telex
dated 12th of April 1940 from the German Embassy in Copenhagen to
Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin.
29 The archives of Landsbrugsraadet: Meddelelse fra Præsidiet til
Raadets Medlemmer. no. 13/1940. (Reports from the Presidency to the
Members of the Council).
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Raadets Medlemmer. no. 14/1940.(Reports from the Presidency to the
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Members of the Council). and Rigsarkivet: UM 1909-1945, H64-190.
Report dated 13th of April 1940 written by A. P. Jacobsen and sent to the
Ministry of Agriculture. At the same time the population of poultry should
be reduced heavily. The reason was that since no one could foresee,
how long the occupation would last, the farmers had to reduce the
population of pigs which could be regenerated shortly, while it takes
years to regenerate herds of cattle.
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Oplysninger for de tyske Forhandlere, da man maatte forudse, at
Tyskerne vilde være interesseret i Fremtidige Leverancer fra Danmark,
og hvis Danmark ikke havde en Plan for den fremtidige Tilrettelæggelse
af Produktionen rede, vilde man kunne risikere, at de tyske Forhandlere
vilde prøve at faa Indflydelse paa den fremtidige Produktions
Tilrettelægning.” The archives of Landsbrugsraadet: Meddelelse fra
Præsidiet til Raadets Medlemmer. no. 14/1940. (Reports from the
Presidency to the Members of the Council).
33  See for instance Backe, Herbert: Um die Nahrungsfreiheit Europas.
Weltwirtschaft oder Großraum. Leipzig 1942. and Walter, Alex:
“Landwirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit im Europa. Bericht über
Landwirtschaft”. In: Zeitschrift für Agrarpolitik und Landwirtschaft. 28
(1942/43). 351–59.
34 “ved hjælp af Prisreguleringer i ikke ringe grad kunde regulere
Produktion paa forskellige Markeder” Rigsarkivet: UM 1909-1945,
Dmk-Tyskland Handelstraktatforhold XXXIX, nr. H64-190. Summary of a
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jeg blot lige nævne i samme Aandedræt, for det er noget, vi kan faa
‘Fornøjelse’ af.”: Udførligt referat af Landbrugsraadets Møde den
23.5.1940 (detailed report of the meeting in the Agricultural Council on
the 23rd of May 1940). The archives of Landsbrugsraadet: Meddelelse
fra Præsidiet til Raadets Medlemmer. Raadsmøder 1938–40. (Reports
from the Presidency to the Members of the Council). The reporter made
quick notes in the summaries, so the quotation is also very odd in
Danish but it means that Dr. Hasselbach suggested that the Danish and
the German negotiators in community estimated rapid price increases
on butter while prices on pork and eggs almost were kept unchanged.
He argued that this was in the interest of both sides.
36  Bundesarchiv: BAarch: R16/1306. “Vermerk über die Besprechung
bei Herrn Staatssekretär Backe am 15. Mai 1940. Betrifft: Dänemark”.
37 The rationale behind this was that it would be impossible to manage
some 200.000 Danish farmers by the use of restrictions and controls.
This would only cause a black market for food.
38 Ibid.
39 The archives of Landsbrugsraadet: Meddelelse fra Præsidiet til
Raadets Medlemmer. no. 19/1940. (Reports from the Presidency to the
Members of the Council).
40 “paa købmandsmæssig, strengt forretningsmæssig Maade”: The
archives of Landsbrugsraadet: Raadsmøde 28. juni 1940.
41 The archives of Landsbrugsraadet: Meddelelse fra Præsidiet til
Raadets Medlemmer. no. 23/1940. (Reports from the Presidency to the
Members of the Council). and Summary of the Council meeting
(Raadsmøde) on the 28th of June 1940.
42  Bundsarchiv: BAarch: R901/67771. Summary of a meeting in REM
on the 19th of June 1940: “Preispolitik bei der Einfuhr
landwirtschaftlicher Erzeugnisse aus Dänemark”.
43 Danmarks Statistik: Statistiske Meddelelser 4. Række, 127 Bind, 3
Hæfte. Landbrugsstatistik 1945 herunder Havebrug, Skovbrug
m.v. København 1947, 150, 163, 167. It is important to be aware of that
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that the three types of prices were interrelated, so producer prices so to
speak were a weighted average of export- and consumer prices. Then
the government gave subsidizes to keep up producer prices or keep
down Danish consumer prices.
44 Ibid. From January 1941 export prices on butter were 5,10 kroner per
kg while the domestic consumer prices were 3,89 kroner per kg, so
export prices were 31 percent higher than consumer prices. In the first
quarter of 1941 the Germans offered to pay five kroner per kg for an
export quantity of 8.000 million kg and 5,25 kroner per kg for export
quantities above 8.000 million kg as an incentive to export more butter
and to maintain the Lieferfreudigkeit. It is important to note that the
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Denmark – where food imports accounted for a substantial part – by a
growing deficit on the clearing account in the Danish central bank.
45 In a report to van Scherpenberg in Auswärtiges Amt on the 18th of
February 1941 Dr. Walter was very pessimistic regarding Denmark. He
was concerned that further price increases on food would cause social
disturbances in Denmark. Bundesarchiv: BAarch: R901/67311. Report
written by Dr. Walter: “Wirtschaftslage Dänemarks”.
46 At meetings between the Danish-German Government Committees
in the beginning of July 1942 Dr. Walter was very clear in his statements.
He declared that the domestic market for food had precedence
compared to exports, and that it had been the policy from the beginning
of the occupation. Rigsarkivet: UM 1909-1945: H64-194. Letter from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Agriculture dated 7th of July
1942. The issue will be clarified in my dissertation projected for
publication in 2005.
47  Bundesarchiv: BAarch: R901/67771. Report dated 9th of November
1940 written by Dr. Walter and sent to Legationsrat von Scherpenberg in
Auswärtiges Amt: “Bericht über die deutsch-dänischen Verhandlungen
auf landwirtschaftlichen Gebieten”.
48 Danmarks Statistik: Statistiske Meddelelser 4. Række, 127 Bind, 3
Hæfte. Landbrugsstatistik 1945 herunder Havebrug, Skovbrug m.v.
København 1947, 163.
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50 In a report from Dr. Ebner on the 24th of February 1942 to the
Auswärtiges Amt about negotiations in the Government Committee he
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pigs with deadweight between 101 and 130 kg. Bundesarchiv: BAarch:
R901/67772. Report from Ebner to Auswärtiges Amt dated 24th of
February 1942.
51 On the 22nd of April 1942 Dr. Walter sent a telex to Backe notifying
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R901/67782. Telex from Dr. Walter to Staatssekretär Backe dated 22nd
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52 Rigsarkivet: UM 1909-45, H64-193, 194 and 195. Summaries of
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having taken place from August 1941 to May 1942; Bundesarchiv:
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53 Even though Dr. Walter in a letter to the Auswärtiges Amt on the 17th
of July 1940 noted that the domestic prices on food in the long term had
to be at the same level as the export prices. Bundesarchiv: R901/68173.
Letter dated 17th of July 1940 from Dr. Walter to Auswärtiges Amt:
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Members of the Council).
56 Especially the president of Landbrugsraadet, Henrik Hauch, and the
Minister of Agriculture were very closely related. Hauch joined the
coalition government on the 10th of April 1940 as a supervisor for the
Minister of Agriculture (Hauch was member of the Parliament during the
German occupation elected by the liberal agrarian party Venstre), and
apparently they had a very good understanding of one another.
57 The archives of Landsbrugsraadet: Meddelelse fra Præsidiet til
Raadets Medlemmer. (Reports from the Presidency to the Members of
the Council). no. 6/1941.
58 Andersen 2003, like in footnote 3, 117–129.
59 Rigsarkivet: Ministry of Agriculture 1948-. J04: Statskonsulenten i
Berlin 1921-45 (14/200/13). Package no. 9-12. Estimations made by A.
P. Jacobsen and sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 15th of
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febr. 1941”.
60 Ibid. In his letter from the 2nd of September 1941 Wassard asked
Jacobsen to send a list over which currencies – Reichsmark or Kroner –
different agricultural products were traded in. It is amazing that the
Danish head negotiator did not know this before.
61 Bundesarchiv: R9I/949. Summary of a meeting in Handelspolitischer
Ausschuss on the 7th of April 1941. Dr. Walter points out the same
conclusion in a letter from the 18th of February 1941 to Legationsrat van
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64 This issue will be clarified in my dissertation, which is projected for
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